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This article analyses the effects of the economic
reforms applied by Latin American countries during
the second half of the 1980s and after. In order to
include the reform indices among the elements
determining the per capita gross domestic product, in
accordance with neoclassical growth models, the
authors start by analysing the institutional nature of
these reforms. The econometric analysis, carried out
for a set of 17 Latin American countries for the 1970-
1995 period, revealed that the five reform areas studied
significantly affected GDP. On the basis of empirical
analysis, it can be concluded that: i) the general impact
of the reforms on per capita GDP was positive, as other
studies have found; ii) the main mechanism by which
the reforms raised per capita income was the positive
effect they had on the productivity of the capital factor,
and iii) capital accumulation also responded positively
to the reforms.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 7  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 280
REFORMS AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA  •  ANDREA C.  BANDEIRA AND FERNANDO GARCIA
I
Introduction
During the first half of the 1990s, the growth rates of
the Latin American countries recovered in comparison
with the previous decade. The main factors cited as
causing this recovery included stabilization plans,
which yielded good results, and more favourable
international conditions, associated with improved
liquidity and lower international interest rates; renewed
flows of external capital into the region; and the growth
of the United States economy, mainly from 1992 on.
According to a series of relatively recent studies, the
economic reforms made during the 1980s and 1990s
were among the factors responsible for the region’s
growth. These studies include those by Easterly, Loayza
and Montiel (1997), Fernández-Arias and Montiel
(1997), Barrera and Lora (1997), Burki and Perry
(1997) and Fajnzylber and Lederman (1999), along with
the research project “Growth, employment and equity:
Latin America in the 1990s” carried out by ECLAC,
which includes a series of studies on this subject, such
as those by Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999),
Hofman (2000), Paunovic (2000) and Escaith and
Morley (2000).
A preliminary analysis of the performance of the
Latin American economies during the period of the
reforms reveals that average growth rates were higher
than those posted in the 1980s, although lower than
those between 1950 and 1980, when the “old”
development model prevailed. Using very similar
methodologies, Easterly, Loayza and Montiel (1997)
and Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1997) examine the
question of reforms and reach similar conclusions: in
terms of growth, the response to the economic reforms
was satisfactory and in line with expectations, taking
into consideration international experience in this
respect. The findings of Barrera and Lora (1997) were
similar. They demonstrate that the reforms applied in
the 1980s boosted long-term growth by 1.9 percentage
points compared to the previous period, due above all
to their effects on productivity and investment. The
economy’s total productivity rose 1.7% during the
period under study, while the average rate of investment
in the region grew by a similar amount.1
1 Burki and Perry (1997) compiled the results of the three studies
mentioned in this paragraph.
Using the same methodology of growth accounting,
Fajnzylber and Lederman (1999) tried to measure the
effects of the economic reforms on total factor productivity
in 18 Latin American economies. The main conclusion of
their study was that, on average, productivity rose faster
during the periods of economic reform.
With regard to the ECLAC research project mentioned
above, Paunovic (2000) and Hofman (2000) examine
the relationship between the reforms and Latin America’s
economic performance during the 1990s. On the basis
of political economy concepts, the first of these authors
analyses the reasons why the region’s countries fall into
sub-groups according to their performance in terms of
growth rates, along with the relationships between this
segmentation and each country’s degree of progress in
its reforms. According to this author, the countries which
applied most reforms and managed to effectively stabilize
their economies were the ones that posted the highest
growth rates during the 1990s. Hofman (2000), for his
part, examines the economic growth of a number of
countries in the region and highlights the differences in
GDP growth rates observed among those economies over
time. He analyses the performance of this country sample
at the aggregate level and in terms of economic growth,
factor accumulation and different types of productivity
measurement. He divides the period from 1950 to 1998
into sub-periods, using the debt crisis and the subsequent
economic recovery as reference points. Based on this
division, and applying growth accounting methods,
Hofman draws some conclusions regarding each country.
In general terms, during the reform period the countries
under study registered a recovery compared to the 1980s
(a period of crisis), but in terms of certain variables they
did not manage to equal their performance during the
1950-1980 period.
The article by Escaith and Morley (2000) evaluates
the same five areas of reform as our study, that is, trade
openness, capital account liberalization, privatisation,
and financial and tax reforms, and their impact on the
growth of 17 Latin American economies from 1970 to
1996. On the basis of a statistical model which takes
into consideration a large number of control variables,2
2 These control variables include indicators for macroeconomic
policy management and the dynamism of the international economy.
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the authors conclude that altogether the reforms did
not directly affect the region’s economic growth, and
they assume that this was due to the compensatory
effects of the different reforms. Only tax reforms and
capital account liberalization had a significant impact
on these countries’ economic performance. The authors
do not, however, discount the possibility that the
reforms may have indirectly affected growth in Latin
America during the period under study, through such
factors as investment and macroeconomic stability.
The claims made in the studies mentioned earlier
that the reforms positively affected the economic growth
of the Latin American countries were the starting point
of this investigation. In contrast with some of these
studies, however, the aim of the present article is not
only to analyse the reforms’ effects on growth, for there
seems to be a consensus in the relevant literature that
the general impact of the reforms was significant and
positive. Here, conversely, the aim is to investigate how
and through what mechanisms this effect was produced,
considering what have been described as the prime
sources of growth: factor accumulation and
productivity.
This article is based on a different methodological
approach from those used in most other studies of this
subject. According to Temple (1999), the most common
approach is based on ad hoc or informal growth
regressions. Recent studies applying this method are
essentially based on work by Barro (1991) and they
link the rise in the product to a set of variables
considered relevant from the empirical or theoretical
point of view. However, the specification that must be
calculated does not derive directly from theoretical
models, which is why these regressions are called
informal. The variables under consideration can be
divided into two groups. The first corresponds to the
initial level of the so-called state variables: the stock of
physical and human capital, the latter in the form of
indicators of educational level. The second group
consists of control variables, such as government
consumption as a percentage of GDP, the profit margin
in the parallel foreign exchange market, the degree of
political instability, and changes in the terms of trade,
among others.
The present article is based on the premise that for
a number of reasons a solid theoretical foundation and
a formal empirical analysis can help in investigating
the impact of these reforms. The most important of these
reasons, for the purpose of this article, is that a
theoretical formulation allows us to develop and test
different hypotheses regarding the mechanisms by
which the reforms affected the region’s performance.3
In addition to the present Introduction (section I),
this article is composed of four more sections which
analyse the relationship between economic reforms,
institutional changes, and economic growth and its
determinants (factor accumulation and productivity).
Section II summarizes the main reforms adopted in
Latin America –trade openness, financial and tax
reforms, privatisation, liberalization of the capital
account, and reforms in the areas of labour and social
security– and analyses to what degree the reforms can
be considered as changes of an institutional nature. For
this purpose, Hirsch’s approach (1988) from the
perspective of law and economics is the theoretical
reference used.
Section III briefly describes the economic growth
model on which the empirical part of this article is
based, which is Solow’s growth theory, with the
incorporation of contributions from Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992), Hall and Jones (1996 and 1999) and
Jones (2000). Two methods for including variables
representing institutional changes in neo-classical
growth models are then examined, one using the
concept of social infrastructure, developed by Hall and
Jones (1996 and 1999) and formalized by Jones (2000),
while the other is based on the work of Garcia et al.
(1999). On the basis of this theoretical economic growth
model, section IV analyses the empirical relationship
between the reform indices developed by Morley,
Machado and Pettinato (1999) and factor productivity
and capital accumulation. This analysis examines the
reforms’ impact on the per capita product, economic
growth and factor accumulation of the Latin American
countries in the past two decades, which makes it
possible to identify the main mechanism by which these
economic reforms generated growth: namely, by
increasing the productivity of capital. Section V briefly
sets out some final considerations, and lastly the
Appendix presents convergence equation estimates.
3 Furthermore, using a specific theoretical model permits
comparison with other theoretical approaches, particularly the
model established for economic growth. As a result, the econometric
results obtained using formal empirical models can also be
compared with those of other studies, such as those by Campos
and Nugent (1998) and Piedrahita (1998). This approach also helps
to identify and evaluate the economic significance of dummy
variables and coefficients estimated using panel data models, as
proposed by Islam (1995), for example.
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II
Economic reforms and institutional changes
Since the 1940s and 1950s, the Latin American
economic situation has been characterized by strong
protectionism and the presence of the State in various
economic sectors and activities. As from the second
half of the 1980s, that structure began to give way to a
new strategy which, among other aspects, gave priority
to market liberalization, a more outward-oriented
approach (in the sense of stimulating trade and exports),
and less State intervention. This set of policies gradually
evolved throughout the region. The process had begun
in the 1970s, in the midst of the first oil crisis. In that
period, the reforms dealt with fewer areas than in the
decades that followed and were restricted to a small
number of countries. Despite their progress on many
fronts, in the early 1980s most reform efforts suffered
a setback due to the debt crisis, and it was only in the
years that followed, especially from 1985 on, that the
reforms gathered renewed strength and began to affect
more economies. Then, in the late 1980s and early
1990s, as the process consolidated throughout the
region, these measures ceased to be regarded as
stabilization policies and began to be recognized as
structural reforms.
The consensus concerning the need to carry out
reforms of this nature was based on the perception that
the “old” development strategy had become incapable
of guaranteeing economic growth, mainly because of
the imbalances, distortions and inefficiencies generated
by the policies applied from the 1940s and 1950s
onward.4  According to the consensus that developed
after the debt crisis, strong protectionism, over-
involvement of the State and excessive market
regulation had reduced economic efficiency, restricting
productivity growth, assigning resources badly, and
limiting private enterprise. This was because when it
came to making investment decisions, the actions of
the State carried greater weight than efficiency criteria.
According to Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999),
the various Latin American countries gradually
developed their own particular view of how the
economy should function and what role the government
should play.
In the light of the way this process evolved from
1985 to the mid-1990s, the extensive literature on this
subject identifies seven main areas of reforms: trade,
finance, taxation, capital account liberalization,
privatisation, social security and the labour market.
Because of their scope and the number of countries
involved, the first five reform areas became known as
first generation reforms, while the last two –social
security and the labour market, which are still in their
initial stages in the case of most Latin American
countries– tend to be considered, along with another
group of measures,5  as second generation economic
reforms.
The first attempt at quantifying Latin American
reforms may be attributed to Lora (1997), who
developed a structural policy index for a set of 18
economies for the period from 1985 to 1995. This index
is a simple average of another five indices reflecting
changes in the areas of trade, taxation, finance,
privatisation and the labour market, respectively.
Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999) developed
another reform index for the 1970-1995 period for a
sample of 17 Latin American countries.6  As with the
Lora index, this was composed of another five indices
for trade, finance, taxation, capital account
liberalization, and privatisation.7  Figure 1 shows the
behaviour of the six indices, the general index being
the result of the simple average of the indices for each
reform. These indices provide an overview of the trends
and scope of these reforms from 1970 to 1995, along
with the different behaviour of each of the five areas
under analysis.
4 With regard to the specific objectives and technical details of the
different areas of reform, see Edwards (1995), Lora (1997), IDB
(1997), Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999) and Bandeira (2000).
5 Particularly reforms of the State, mainly in the administrative
area, and of institutions such as the legal system and the educational
system.
6 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
7 The authors did not include social security and labour market
reforms because these were still very incipient during the period
analysed. In the preparation of these indices, only policy variables
under government control were considered, and the indices were
normalized within a 0 to 1 interval, assigning the value of 1 to any
structure completely free of distortion.
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Notwithstanding the fact that each reform area may
have had important specific characteristics which were
as relevant as the differences between countries, this
section seeks to develop a general argument applicable
to the process of change which affected the Latin
American economies.8  Generally, the literature on
reforms in Latin America only highlights their
economic side: their effect on relative prices. This
article, however, argues that these reforms represented
not just economic but also institutional changes.
As from the 1940s and 1950s, the State gradually
assumed a crucial role in the economies of Latin
America, propelling an industrialization process based
on import substitution. The economic repercussions of
its actions have been substantial. It may be said that
the functioning of the different markets and their
interaction has depended on the whole structure created
in the period prior to the 1980s. This environment,
however, while favouring the industrialization process
in many countries, generated various kinds of
distortions, especially in the system of relative prices,
resulting in inefficient allocation of resources, low
productivity and loss of well-being. In this sense the
reforms begun in the 1980s, by reducing controls on
the different markets, represented significant economic
changes.
Similarly, the reforms can also be said to have
triggered an important process of institutional change,
since they altered the “appropriability” of rights,
transaction costs, the structure of the yield on
investments, the environment in which trade was carried
out, and the contracts between economic agents, as well
as the rules governing property rights. The way
economies function and the role placed by the State
constitute the starting point for the debate about the
institutional nature of the reforms. The basis for this
analysis is a relatively new field in economic science:
the application of microeconomic considerations in the
field of law. The arguments that follow are based on
FIGURE 1
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Source: Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999).
8 Bandeira (2000) gives detailed data on the different reform areas
and national experiences and provides a summary of the main
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two major studies of this subject: Hirsch (1988) and
Cooter and Ulen (1988).
Just as the price structures within economies were
affected by the type of development of the Latin
American countries, the economic agents’ ability to
appropriate their rights may also have been similarly
conditioned in previous decades. This finally led to a
situation that has been defined as the “imperfect
appropriability” of rights. This concept is directly
related with the idea of externalities, which arise when
one economic agent’s consumption or production
affects another’s profits, without the market providing
suitable compensation. This amounts to saying that the
functions of individuals or companies are
interdependent. According to Cooter and Ulen (1988),
the essence of the problem arising from the existence
of externalities lies in the fact that maximizing profits
does not automatically lead to efficient solutions within
the economy. Those who make rational decisions
centred on their own interest generally do not take into
account the effect they may have on the profits or
production of others. Thus, these effects occur without
the consent of others and without due compensation.
Why does this occur? One of the main reasons is
the imperfect appropriation of rights. Returning once
again to the elements presented by Hirsch (1988), this
imperfect appropriation occurs when an economic agent
is unable to appropriate the full marginal value of the
benefits generated or cannot avoid the cost imposed by
another agent in the case of a negative externality.
Therefore, even when from the economic point of view
whoever exercises the right should be able to make
decisions on resource use and claim the benefits these
generate, other factors may mean that this right is not
guaranteed. In this sense, just as rights help to define
the set of opportunities and the behaviour of the agents
–and hence the results of their actions and choices– the
degree to which these rights are protected (degree of
fulfilment) undoubtedly also influences these elements.
There are reasons and factors of an ethical and
institutional nature which may help to reduce the
appropriability of rights. When this happens, the validity
of the so-called exclusion principle becomes uncertain.
According to Musgrave’s definition (1959), this
principle establishes that people cannot enjoy the
benefits of a specific item of merchandise unless they
are willing to pay its owner the going price. This
principle can be extended to the use of factors of
production and any benefits or profits deriving from
these. If it were possible to consume a certain item of
merchandise by mutual agreement, without due
compensation, this principle would be violated. If the
cost associated with guaranteeing exclusivity were high,
that is, if it required considerable resources, the validity
of the principle would also become uncertain and the
appropriability of rights would be imperfect. Under
these circumstances, when an exchange occurs or
factors are used in productive activities, the agents end
up effectively absorbing the cost of excluding other
agents from consumption (or from the benefits arising
from the activity). In other words, in the case in question
the transaction costs would be higher, with three
important consequences: i) reduction of the number of
transactions within the economy; ii) interference in the
existence of markets; and iii) the perpetuation of
externalities.
Thus, to a large extent the appropriability of rights
conditions the decisions of economic agents.
Guaranteeing and satisfying property rights promotes
the efficient use of resources within the capitalist
system. According to the legal and regulatory
framework –the institutions of the law– agents have
more or less confidence that they will receive the
appropriate profits from the use of their property
(Hirsch, 1988, p. 25). It can therefore be argued that
both the accumulation of factors and changes in
productivity depend on institutional development, the
central aspect of which is the degree of appropriability
of rights. This means that the performance of a given
country in terms of economic growth and social well-
being will ultimately depend on the prevailing
institutional structure.
This conclusion is crucial for understanding the
institutional nature of the reforms. In the Latin
American countries, in each area and market where
there was State intervention it is possible to identify
factors which ended up reducing the agents’ ability to
appropriate their rights.9  One factor common to almost
every area was the extremely discretional nature of
governmental decisions and policies. Obviously, all
public policy contains an arbitrary component, which
may be associated with the government’s ideological
or political position. In the case of the Latin American
countries, however, it could be argued that this
component was particularly pronounced, mainly
9 It should be borne in mind that the institutional structure of a
country alone will not guarantee the perfect appropriation of rights.
The idea set forth in this article is that the special circumstances of
Latin America have meant that, compared to other countries or
regions, it has a lower degree of appropriability of rights, thus
affecting accumulation, productivity and economic growth.
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because of the nature of the industrialization process,
which was led by the State. As from the 1970s, this
discretional aspect rose still further due to the increase
in domestic and external imbalances. In reality, this
component was always more closely associated with
the adjustment plans implemented by the different
countries in response to imbalances. In other words,
both economic aspects and those typical of the
development model chosen by most of the countries of
the region reinforced the arbitrary component inherent
in the formulation and implementation of public
policies. Thus, the time frame and the results expected
by the economic agents were often affected by
unexpected changes of course due to arbitrary decisions
of the government.10
This reading of the previous economic model and
the nature of the economic reforms applied in Latin
America, which differs from the prevalent view in the
literature on this subject, is a crucial argument of this
article, for it makes possible an evaluation of the
mechanisms whereby the reforms’ effects were
materialized, on the basis of a theoretical approach that
combines neoclassical growth fundamentals with the
theoretical aspects of the New Institutional Economy.
III
Institutional changes, factor productivity and growth
Several recent studies and research papers have
analysed the effect of institutional variables on
economic performance, especially with regard to
growth and inequality. One of the fundamental
principles in this line of work derives from concepts
developed by Douglass North in the sphere of the New
Institutional Economy. More specifically, several
studies analyse the role of institutions in explaining the
causes of economic growth, including the effects that
institutional changes have had on factor productivity
and accumulation. The studies by Hall and Jones (1996
and 1999), Jones (2000) and Garcia et al. (1999) follow
this line.
The articles by Hall and Jones develop the concept
of infrastructure in order to explain the differences in
the output per worker observed in different economies.
To do so, the authors start from an analysis based on an
aggregate production function and the concept of factor
accumulation. According to this analysis, country
differences in the output per worker can be attributed
to differences in physical capital, human capital, and
total factor productivity: i.e., to what have been called
the determinants of growth, considered to be associated
fundamentally with the social infrastructure of an
economy. Hall and Jones define social infrastructure
as the government (or public) policies and institutions
that determine the environment in which people
accumulate skills and companies accumulate capital,
invest in technology and generate output. According to
these authors, a structure that encourages productive
activities and capital accumulation, skills acquisition,
technology transfer and invention should lead to higher
levels of output per worker.
Hall and Jones (1996 and 1999) start with a scheme
based on a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production
function in which each country’s product Y is
determined by the stock of physical capital K, human

















where y = (Y/L) and h = (H/L). This equation allows us
to break down the differences in the output per worker
between countries into three parts: the capital-output
ratio, education, and productivity. On the basis of this
scheme, the authors make an empirical study of the
relation between the output per worker and a set of
variables that act as proxies for social infrastructure,
since there is no group of variables that represents this
concept directly.
Jones (2000) develops the idea of social
infrastructure theoretically and proposes changes in the
neoclassical growth model. The production function
mentioned above is restated as follows:








 = eφ.u [2]
10 Bandeira (2000) analyses in detail how the economic reforms in
Latin America tried, directly or indirectly, to increase the agents’
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where I represents the influence of the economy’s
infrastructure on total factor productivity: economies
with the same values for K, h and L can have different
levels of output per worker, if the economic
environments in which these inputs are used are
different.
Garcia et al. (1999) analyse the functional form
for including institutional development in Solow’s
growth model, together with its conceptual
consequences with regard to a modern institutional
economy, following the line of work developed by
Douglass North. Starting from the thesis put forward
by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), they propose two
other possible hypotheses about the institutional
variable’s influence on the product and on the
productivity of the economic factors. The first of these
considers that institutions directly affect the productivity
of physical capital, just as knowledge influences labour
productivity. Based on this hypothesis, physical capital,
corrected for the degree of institutional development I,














α, β > 0 and α + β < 1 [3]
The second way of evaluating the influence of
institutional changes consists of viewing institutions as
a production factor. Thus, it is posited that there is a
stock of institutions that, along with other production
factors, determines the economy’s aggregate product.
According to this proposal, the variable indicating the
degree of institutional development is incorporated into
the Cobb-Douglas production function raised to the
exponent γ and is multiplied by the product of the other
production factors, as shown in equation [4]. The
difference between this second hypothesis and that of
Jones (2000) consists of the idea that institutions
directly influence the average and marginal productivity
of the other production factors in so far as a γ that is














)1 – α – β – γ,
α, β, γ > 0 and α + β + γ < 1 [4]
Garcia et al. (1999) calculate convergence and
product determination equations for a sample of 67
countries, using a scale of satisfaction with political
freedom as a proxy for the degree of institutional
development. The results of these calculations and
comparison of the institutional variable coefficients
indicate that the adjustment hypothesis defining
effective capital is more empirically valid.
The inclusion of institutional variables in growth
models in order to analyse the effects of economic
reforms in Latin America was defined on the basis of
the theoretical approach described earlier. We started
from the hypothesis that the reforms, by eliminating
restrictions and reducing discretionality, increased the
possibility of appropriating rights and reduced
distortions in relative prices, as discussed in the previous
section, thus affecting factor productivity and capital
accumulation within the economy. The initial
hypothesis considered was that reforms only influenced
the product in the case of physical capital. Applying
this effective capital hypothesis, the neoclassical
production function was restated, replacing physical












)1 – α, with 0 < α < 1 [5]
Apart from the effective capital hypothesis, two
other assumptions were also considered, each
corresponding to a new specification of the production
function. The first relates the institutional variable to
human factor productivity according to models for
estimating the influence of knowledge on this variable:
this hypothesis has been called the effective human
capital hypothesis. In this case, human capital is
replaced by a variable that expresses this factor, adjusted











)1 – α, 0 < α < 1 [6]
The second assumption takes into consideration
the institutional variable’s effect on the total
productivity of the economy, which assumes that the
institutional structure influences the productivity of all
factors, as shown in equation [7], which coincides




t [Ktα (AtHt)1 – α], 0 < α < 1 [7]
Using the same hypotheses as the Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992) model regarding the initial stock and
accumulation of knowledge, equation [5] can be applied
11 Unlike Garcia et al. (1999), who use the Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992) specification of human capital, here it was decided to
include this variable in the Hall and Jones (1996 and 1999) and
Jones (2000) models.
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to derive a specification for the output per worker. If
the function is rewritten in shortened form, we have:
[5’]
y = (Ik)α
where y = Y/AH, k = K/AH and H = eφ.uL





egt, and using the same hypothesis as Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) that ln A
0 
= a + ε, where a is a
technological constant and ε is a specific random impact
on the economy and, to simplify, t = 0, a final
specification is obtained that includes the variable
associated with institutional change, as represented by
equation [8].12  In this equation, the coefficient
associated with the degree of institutional development
is, at least in theoretical terms, identical to the coefficient
for the physical capital saving effort. If these
coefficients were different, however, there is evidence
suggesting that the degree of institutional development
would influence not only capital productivity. In that
case, one of the other assumptions considered could be
expected to prevail. The empirical formulae for these
follow the same logic as equation [8] and are shown in




































 ln (n + g + d) + φ.u + ε
t
[10]
The study of the effects of reforms on capital
accumulation was based on the corresponding equation
defining that process, as well as on a corollary of the
Solow model. If, to simplify, knowledge is treated as
constant and depreciation as non-existent, the
expression for the accumulation of this factor
establishes that the change in capital stock per worker
in an economy depends on two factors: savings per
worker and the growth rate of the labour force. This
equation is restated in the expression below, in which k











In this sense, to influence the capital accumulation
process reforms must change the first term, given that in
this model labour market dynamics are determined by
demographic aspects. Thus, in theoretical terms, the effects
of reforms on the accumulation process are of the same
nature as their influence on the generation of the amount
of savings per worker within the economy. In line with
the hypothesis that savings equal investment, their impact
on investment per worker is of the same nature.
As indicated, according to the Solow model
formulation, the corollary conclusion is that factors are
remunerated according to their marginal productivity.
With regard to the problem of maximizing company
profits, the following relationship is obtained:
Y
r = α 
K
 , where 0 < α < 1, [12]
which defines the long-term interest rate or yield on
capital. Investment is negatively related to this rate,
because it reflects the marginal productivity of capital,
which goes down with the stock of this factor. Likewise,
the fraction of this product that goes to accumulation
is not only related to r, but also to family decisions,
which reflect such factors as personal preferences, point
~ ~
~~
12 Solow’s capital accumulation equation (1956), in which s
k
 reflects
the saving rate, n the population growth rate, g the level of
technological innovation and d the rate of depreciation, could also
be rewritten in shortened form as follows:
k = s
k 
y – (n + g + d) k
In a steady state, the variation in capital stock per unit of effective
human capital is nil. We thus reach a break-even point, that is, a
point where gross investment is in equilibrium. If equation [5’] is
substituted in this equation, we have the capital stock per unit of
labour in the steady state, as expressed by k*. By substituting the
corresponding expression for this variable, we obtain the equation
for the product per unit of effective human capital in the steady
state, indicated by y*. Both equations are given below:
k* = ( n + g + d )  and  y* = Iα/1–α ( n + g + d )
If y* is defined as the output per worker in the steady state, we
have:
y* = Iα/1–α ( n + g + d )
If the above equation is stated in linear form by applying the natural
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in the life cycle, and institutional aspects. Let us assume
that the first two factors can be captured by the
dependency ratio by age: the higher this ratio, the lower
the savings. Similarly, the influence of institutional
elements, the context in which the reforms are applied,
follows the line of reasoning analysed above. This simple
theoretical scheme makes it possible to study the
evolution of investment per worker and the effect of the
reforms on this variable, using the following expression:
i = s
k
 f (k) = g (r, dep, I) [13]
where i is the investment per worker, dep the
dependency ratio by age, and I the indicator of
economic reforms. It may be expected, therefore, that
g’(r) < 0, g’(dep) < 0, and g’(I) > 0. The effect of
reforms, if significant, must be positive, because of the
economic and institutional nature of the measures
applied.
IV
Economic reforms, institutional changes
and growth in Latin America
The empirical analysis of the effects of reforms during
the period from 1970 to 1995 was carried out using a
balanced sample of 17 Latin American countries. The
set of economies was defined according to the
availability of data on the reform variables, in this case
the six indices formulated by Morley, Machado and
Pettinato (1999). Once these indicators had been
prepared for the 1970-1995 period, this also defined
the time interval to be considered. Six chronological
observations were used for each country (1970, 1975,
1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995). Thus, the data bank
comprised a total of 102 observations. The other
variables were formulated according to World Bank
indicators (World Bank, 2000) and data from Barro and
Lee (1996), updated to 1995.13
The hypothesis assumed a constant depreciation
rate of 3% per year, equal for all the countries. The
exercise began with a g rate set at 1.2%, likewise
constant and identical for all countries, in line with the
basic Solow model.14  However, the hypothesis that
ln A
(0)
 = a + ε permits the inclusion of differences
between countries in the level of knowledge or
technology, which are captured by dummy variables
for each country. With regard to the reform indices, the
original variable I
t
 was changed to take into
consideration the fact that these indicators are limited
to the interval between 0 and 1. It was therefore
considered that I
t
 = eη where η represents the reform
indices (both the general index and those associated
with the five areas of reforms). Savings correspond to
the average rate posted over the 20 years prior to the
period under analysis, and the rate n reflects the average
between five-year sub-periods.
To begin with, specifications were estimated for
the output per worker and per capita product, although
the model’s theoretical equations actually take into
consideration the first case. With regard to the per capita
product, the variable n represents the population growth
rate and the model behaves as if everyone had a job. In
general, the regressions that use the per capita product
were those posting the best results. Consequently, and
bearing in mind the problems associated with measuring
the labour force in the countries of the region, per capita
product was defined as a dependent variable.
The econometric analysis was divided into two
parts. One involved investigating the impact on total
factor productivity or the productivity of each factor
considered individually. The other analysed the impact
on capital accumulation. The first estimate was
based on equation [14] below, in which i = 1, ...17, and
t = 1, ... 6. According to the theoretical values predicted
in equations [8], [9] and [10], the evaluation of the
13 The data used in the regressions can be obtained from Bandeira
(2000) or directly from the authors of the present article.
14 The values assigned to these two rates follow the general lines
established in the literature on growth. See, for example, Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992). In the specific case of the technological
innovation rate, we followed Piedrahita (1998), who assumes that
g is equal to the average real per capita GDP growth rate in Latin
America for the period from 1916 to 1989, as established by the
World Bank.
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coefficient for the variable representing institutional
change should define the most probable hypothesis: if
the reforms only influence the productivity of the
physical factor, if they only affect the productivity of
human capital, or if they have a general impact on the





) = β0 + β1 ln Ii,t + β2 ln ski,t
–β3 ln (ni,t + g + d) + β4ui,t + εi,t [14]
Table 1 shows the results of these regressions. All
the models were estimated using the least squares
method with fixed effects.15  Preliminary test results
on the importance of including dummy variables
indicated that only the fixed effect for countries was
significant. The fact that the chronological dummy
variables were not significant may be due to the
correlation between those variables, educational level
and the reform indices, since the last two do reflect a
tendency.
The basic model estimated in table 1 corresponded
to equation [14] and did not take into account the reform
index. This variable, like the specific indices for each
area, was gradually incorporated in order to identify
its partial effects. The results for the first regression
were quite reasonable and served as a point of reference
for analysing the impact of the reforms. The coefficients
for saving and average schooling were significant at
the 5% level and had the expected sign. In contrast, the
coefficient associated with the variable n + g + d was
not significant. This result seems to be related to the
fact that this variable shows little variance and a high
degree of multiple collinearity, reflected in the high
value of the VIF statistic for every specification.
The second model, which included the general
index of the reforms, gave better results. Through an
estimate carried out using least squares with dummy
variables, there was a slight increase in the adjusted
R2, while the standard error of the regression declined.
There were no signs of heteroskedasticity. The reform
coefficient was significant at the 5% level and showed
TABLE 1
Latin America: Determination of per capita product, 1970-1995a
Basic Reform Trade Financial Capital Privatisation Tax
model index openness reform account reform
liberalization
Ln(sK) 0.647 0.654 0.677 0.646 0.627 0.649 0.658
(0.112) (0.106) (0.110) (0.108) (0.111) (0.108) (0.106)
Ln(n+g+d) 0.350 0.427 0.374 0.407 0.433 0.319 0.390
(0.250) (0.239) (0.245) (0.244) (0.250) (0.242) (0.238)
Schooling (u) 0.072 0.031 0.042 0.042 0.061 0.077 0.028
(0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026)
Reform (I) 0.394 0.190 0.160 0.194 0.625 0.346
(0.125) (0.089) (0.064) (0.103) (0.235) (0.110)
Adjusted R2 0.955 0.960 0.957 0.958 0.956 0.958 0.959
Mean standard error 0.130 0.124 0.127 0.126 0.128 0.125 0.123
White’s test - n. R2 24.800 23.540 24.542 27.164 29.165 27.267 23.379
χ2 (5%) 37.653 43.773 43.773 43.773 43.773 43.773 43.773
F - fixed effectb 68.883 76.236 70.698 73.552 69.558 74.358 76.879
Hausman test 6.15 8.08 7.33 6.64 7.17 6.62 6.56
a Numbers in brackets are the standard errors of the estimates.
b The F statistic calculated for the fixed effect test is equal to 2.24. The basic model has 82 degrees of freedom, the other models 81.
15 In line with the studies by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)
and Islam (1995) on the nature of the term A
0
, and in view of
the hypotheses regarding the behaviour of that term, it was
decided to work with the fixed effect model. The technological
constant represents not only knowledge, but also all other aspects
related to factor productivity. In this context, the fixed effects
for countries indicate productivity differences which, given their
formulation, are correlated with the model’s explanatory
variables (saving, population growth and reforms). At all events,
the Hausman test was applied to every empirical model in order
to evaluate the possibility that the residual terms were not related
to the set of explanatory variables, which would imply a better
estimate of the parameters on the basis of the random effects
model.
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a low degree of correlation with the other variables of
the model. Another interesting point concerned the
human capital factor. The estimated coefficient for this
variable, when controlled for the fixed effect by country
and reforms, was low and insignificant. This was also
due to the high collinearity and low tolerance of the
coefficient in this second model (the VIF reached 8.003).
Thus, the specifications in table 1 display a certain
degree of correlation between the explanatory variables
and the dummy variables for the countries which affects
the estimated value of the coefficients. This problem
did not call for corrective measures, however, because
the level of multiple collinearity seems to be within
acceptable margins.
In order to analyse the impact of each reform
separately, the general reform index was replaced
sequentially by each of its components, yielding the
five models that follow. All represent values of adjusted
R2 that are higher and mean standard error that are lower
than the basic model. The estimated coefficients for
the s
k
 variables were very stable, with the implicit α
staying somewhere between 0.38 and 0.40, while the
coefficients associated with the n + g + d variable were
not significant. As regards the reform indices by area,
all the other regressions yielded coefficients that were
positive and significant at the 5% level, except the
regression for capital account liberalization, which was
significant at the 10% level. This indicates that each
reform area positively affected the per capita product
during the period under analysis.
To investigate how this effect occurred, a series of
tests were conducted that consisted of applying a set of
linear restrictions on the estimated coefficients for the
s
k
 and I variables. These tests were defined according
to the three theoretical specifications [8], [9] and [10]
which establish the values predicted for each of these
coefficients according to each of the hypotheses under
consideration: effective capital, effective human capital
and total productivity.
Using equation [14], the values for the coefficients
associated with each variable were estimated, but this
expression did not determine a priori which of the
specifications was the most probable; only a coefficient
β1 was assigned to the institutions. Comparing this
estimated coefficient with the others makes it possible
to identify the role of the reforms. If the test of applying
restrictions to the coefficients proves unable to refute
the hypothesis that the coefficient β1 is equal to β2, then
the institutions can be considered to affect the
productivity of capital. In this case, the coefficients
associated with the reform indicator and the rate of
saving should be statistically equal, thus indicating the
validity of the restriction present in equation [5].
If it proves impossible to refute the hypothesis that
β1 = 1, then the conclusion is that institutions respond
to the effective human capital hypothesis, as proposed
in equation [9]. This result is compatible with the
restriction implicit in the theoretical specification
formulated in equation [6]. Finally, if it proves
impossible to refute the hypothesis that β1 is equal to
1 + β2, then a conclusion favourable to the third
hypothesis can be reached, as formulated in equation
[10]: institutions affect both productive factors equally,
thus affecting total factor productivity. This happens
because in this case the effect of institutional reforms
is identical to the sum of their partial effects, both on
physical capital and effective human capital, as
indicated by the reform coefficients in equations [8]
and [9]. Table 2 shows the results of the tests
corresponding to the three hypotheses.
The first test corresponds to the first hypothesis
analysed: that the reforms mainly affect the productivity
of physical capital. Table 2 offers evidence that reforms
in general, and the privatisation process in particular,
had a significant impact on the productivity of this
factor, because it is not possible to reject the hypothesis
that the coefficients associated with s
k 
and I are equal.
In the case of the second hypothesis, regarding effective
human capital, only privatisation seems to have
significantly affected the productivity of the human
capital factor. Evidently, it is not possible to affirm
that the general impact of the reforms and the five
areas under consideration were concentrated on the
total productivity of these economies, in line with the
third theoretical hypothesis. Thus, it can be concluded
that the positive impact of the reforms was associated
with effective capital, or even that this effect on the
product of the region’s countries was mainly due to
an increase in the productivity of physical capital. The
reduction or elimination of controls on the different
markets seems to have promoted more efficient use
of this factor.
The impact of the reforms on capital accumulation
was then estimated. Starting from a parameter 1/3 for
α and working with the product and capital stock series
–the latter calculated according to the methodology
suggested by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993)–, it was
possible to calculate the long-term interest rate r. The
function expressed below was then estimated, assuming
a basic specification in which, once again, i = 1, ..., 17,
and t = 1, ..., 6. For the purpose of this estimate, the
dependency ratio by age was approximated by including
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people 65 years of age and over. First of all the general
index was verified, and then each reform separately.
ln i
i,t
 =  β0 + β1 . ln ri,t + β2.depi,t +β3.Ii,t +µi,t [15]
Table 3 gives the main results and statistics for a
set of specifications. The first model corresponds to
the formulation in which per capita investment is a
function of interest rates and dependency by age. The
next model identifies the fixed effect by country as
significant, indicating the presence of factors not taken
into account in the model which are associated with
each economy and affected investment in the period
under analysis.16  The second model considers the
general reform index as an explanatory variable, in
order to investigate the effect of the set of measures on
capital accumulation.
The basic model’s explanatory power is high
(adjusted R2 of 93.1%). However, if White’s Test is
applied, the hypothesis of heteroskedasticity cannot be
discounted. This indicates that both the interest rate and
dependency by age negatively affect investment. The
coefficient associated with this second variable is not
significant at the 5% level, however. The model that
includes the reform index produced better results. The
adjusted R2 rises slightly as the standard error of the
regression goes down. According to White’s Test, there
are no signs of heteroskedasticity. Inclusion of the
reforms permits correction of the estimated coefficients
for interest rates and dependency by age. The
coefficients for the latter displayed the greatest
variation, while the reform coefficient was significant
at the 5% level and had the expected sign.
TABLE 2






Reform Trade Financial Capital account
Privatisation
Tax
index openness reform liberalization reform
β1 = β2 1.598 3.677 3.859 2.735 0.094 2.075β1 = 1 -4.837 -9.079 -13.120 -7.821 -1.593 -5.932β1 = 1 + β2 -7.758 -11.224 -11.802 -9.051 -3.969 -8.723
a Two-sided calculated t-statistic of 1.98 (Alpha = 5%).
16 The fixed effect tests indicated that it was important to include
the fixed effect of time. In contrast, the inclusion of chronological
dummy variables gave rise to serious problems of heteroskedasticity,
so that it was decided not to take into account the specifications
including those variables.
TABLE 3
Latin America: Determination of per capita investment, 1970-1995a
Basic Reform Trade Financial Capital account
Privatization
Tax
model index openness reform liberalization reform
Ln(r) -0.905 -0.785 -0.857 -0.749 -0.850 -0.939 -0.774
(0.165) (0.157) (0.159) (0.159) (0.163) (0.174) (0.163)
Ln(dep) -0.202 -0.632 -0.601 -0.547 -0.338 -0.222 -0.496
(0.194) (0.215) (0.234) (0.203) (0.201) (0.198) (0.209)
Reform (I) 0.647 0.368 0.324 0.301 0.228 0.459
(0.176) (0.131) (0.087) (0.144) (0.367) (0.151)
Adjusted R2 0.931 0.940 0.937 0.941 0.934 0.931 0.938
Mean standard error 0.186 0.173 0.179 0.173 0.182 0.187 0.178
White’s Test - n.R2 35.799 29.519 32.579 31.333 33.484 39.100 34.234
χ2 (5%) 32.671 37.652 37.652 37.652 37.652 37.652 37.652
F - fixed effect b 57.142 64.808 62.017 66.683 59.704 51.436 63.056
Hausman test 4.49 15.18 8.30 8.48 5.43 6.56 7.15
a Numbers in brackets are standard errors of estimates.
b The F statistic calculated for the fixed effect test equals 2.24. The basic model has 83 degrees of freedom while the others have 82.
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With regard to the areas of reform, except for the
estimated coefficient for privatisation all were
significant at the 5% level. The model that included
privatisation yielded the worst results. The adjusted R2
was the lowest of the specifications in the table, while
the standard error of the regression was the highest.
This was also the only model that showed signs of
heteroskedasticity. If we examine the other four reform
areas, the results clearly indicate the positive impact of
these measures on per capita investment during the
period under analysis. Taken individually, each of the
reforms confirms this result in general terms.
V
Final considerations
The empirical research conducted on the effects of the
economic reforms in Latin America made it possible
to obtain a series of tests to identify the impact of these
policies on the per capita product of the economies of
the region and at the same time provided useful
elements for analysing the mechanisms by which this
impact was materialized. These results must now be
evaluated. On the basis of empirical analysis of the
reforms’ effects, it can be concluded that: i) their general
impact on the per capita product was positive; ii)
considering total and partial factor productivity, the
main channel was the positive effect on the productivity
of the physical capital factor; and iii) capital
accumulation responded positively to the reforms,
except in the case of privatisation, whose effect does
not appear to have been statistically significant. The
third conclusion tends to corroborate the second, in the
sense that with an increase in the marginal productivity
of capital, there should be a sustained or steadier rise
in investment.
The recovery in the per capita product observed in
the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s therefore
appears to be directly linked to the reforms’ effects on
productivity and capital accumulation. However, it
should be noted that these results, like those that appear
in the empirical literature on economic growth in
general, are conditioned by the econometric
specifications and samples used, as well as the set of
control variables selected.
The empirical literature on this subject uses the
product growth rate as dependent variable. As
mentioned in the introduction, these studies show that
the reforms had a positive impact on this rate in recent
years. The exception was the article by Escaith and
Morley (2000), which concluded that the positive
impact of the reforms on growth was, at best, indirect.
The methodology applied in the present article permits
the conclusion that the general impact of the reforms
on the per capita product of these economies was
positive during the 1970-1995 period.17  As table 1
showed, all the reforms contributed to this result.
Similarly, there seems to be proof that the reforms did
in fact reduce distortions in relative prices (economic
aspect) and increased the appropriability of rights,
mainly by limiting discretionary powers (institutional
aspect).
Only the study by Barrera and Lora (1997)
investigated the channels through which the reforms
achieved their impact (higher productivity or capital
accumulation). These authors reached the conclusion
that the main element had been the effect of these
measures on total factor productivity, although a
recovery in investment levels was also observed. The
specifications used in the empirical stage of the present
study made it possible to explore whether this effect
applied to total or partial factor productivity. The results
indicated that physical capital was the factor most
favoured in terms of higher productivity during the
reform process. The reforms’ impact on effective capital
is derived largely from the evidence associated with
privatisation operations. This area of reform can be said
to have clearly affected capital productivity, although
its influence via effective human capital cannot be
discounted. The other four reforms affected the product
and investment, but tests carried out using the estimated
coefficients did not permit a conclusion as to whether
this occurred by way of effective capital or effective
human capital.
17 The appendix examines the effect of the reforms on growth in
the Latin American countries from 1975 to 1995. On the basis of a
theoretical conditional convergence equation, it is considered that,
taken both individually and together, the reforms had a positive
effect on the region’s economic growth.
93C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 7  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 2
REFORMS AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA  •  ANDREA C.  BANDEIRA AND FERNANDO GARCIA
An important corollary to the research presented
in this article has to do with the effect of the reforms
on income distribution. As already noted, the impact
of these policies was greater in the case of physical
capital than on labour. In other words, comparatively
speaking, remuneration of capital must have risen
more than other factors. The relative changes in
productivity, and therefore wages, caused by reforms
may have favoured the concentration of income to
some extent. Morley (2000), who uses the same set of
six economic reform indices  to evaluate the effect of
growth and the reforms on income distribution in Latin
America, found signs that the reforms in general may
have had a regressive effect on this distribution,
although he sustains that it was not very significant,
statistically speaking.
Parallel to the evidence presented by this author,
there is a second study whose conclusions seem to
confirm the impact of the reforms on distribution.
Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) explore the
relationship between the implementation of the
economic reforms and wage differences in 18 Latin
American economies between 1980 and 1998 (as
measures of the reforms they use the same indices as
Morley, Machado and Pettinato). This study offers some
important conclusions. In the first place, the authors
find proof that wage differences between workers with
higher education and those with primary and secondary
education increased considerably, particularly during
the 1990s. With regard to the impact of the reforms,
they reached the conclusion that on average these
profoundly and positively affected these differences,
although this effect tended to decline over time. They
also examined the effect on wage levels: their results,
although preliminary according to the authors, suggest
that the reforms had a positive impact on wage levels.
In short, this study indicates that, taking 1980 as the
starting point, the reforms affected both the average
level and variance of wages.
The empirical results and theoretical implications
of the present article point in the same direction. The
positive effect of the reforms on the productivity of
human capital, although not integral, offers proof that
the wage level for this factor did increase somewhat.
At the same time, the fact that productivity increases
occurred mainly in the case of the capital factor
indicates that the reforms must have negatively affected
income distribution, along the same lines as the increase
in the difference in wages observed in the
aforementioned study.
APPENDIX
The conditional convergence equation
As they affected productivity and capital accumulation, the
economic reforms should be directly linked to the growth in the
per capita product noted in the late 1980s and the first half of the
1990s. To evaluate this effect, the conditional convergence equation
developed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) was used, with the
product expressed, in this case, per unit of effective human capital
y(t), as shown in the following equation:
ln y(t
2
) – ln y(t
1
) = (1–e–λτ) ln y*–(1–e–λτ) ln y(t
1
) [A.1]
The steady-state product, when no restriction is imposed on
the production function in terms of the role of reforms, is expressed
as:
y* = Iγ (
 n + g + d
 ) [A.2]
Substituting equation [A.2] in [A.1], and expressing the output
per worker as y(t) gives the following equation, which permits
evaluation of the general impact of the economic reforms on the
growth rate of the Latin American countries.
ln y(t
2
) – ln y(t
1





) – (1–e–λτ). 
1 – α
 ln(n + g + d) [A.3]
+ (1–e–λτ).φ.u – (1–e–λτ).ln y(t
1
)
+ (1–e–λτ).ln A(0) + g(t2 –e
–λτt1)
According to this formula, the growth rate will be positively
associated with the degree of reform: countries which have applied
more reforms should show higher rates while in the transition
process. The econometric study was based on a set of 17 Latin
American countries but was limited to the period from 1975 to
1995, for reasons of data availability. The specification of this set,
in which i = 1, ..., 17, and t = 1, ..., 5, was based on expression
[A.4] below, which was derived directly from equation [A.3].
∆ ln y(t) = β0 + β1 ln Ii,t + β2 ln ski,t
– β3 ln(ni,t + g + d) + β4ui,t + β5 ln y(t0)i +εi,t [A.4]
where ∆ ln y(t) indicates the difference in product at two points in
time, while y(t
0
) represents the product during the initial period of
the analysis.
Table A.1 gives the main results from the estimation of this
specification, using the fixed effect model. (According to the
Hausman test, this model is appropriate for all specifications). The
basic model, with fixed effect but without reforms, has little
explanatory power, with the set of dummy variables proving
significant. The estimated coefficient associated with the initial
income level is significant at the 5% level and has the expected
sign. This result indicates the validity of the conditional
convergence hypothesis for the income of the region’s countries.
s
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The coefficients for the other variables do not appear to be
significant, except for the break-even point for the investment rate,
n+g+d, which has an inverse sign.
The second specification in the table includes the general reform
index as an explanatory variable in the model with fixed effects.
The rise in adjusted R2 and the reduction in the standard error of
the regression should be noted. There are no signs of
heteroskedasticity problems. The fixed effect test shows the
importance of the set of dummy variables. The coefficient associated
with the reforms is significant (at the 5% level) and indicates that
altogether these measures influenced growth in the countries of
the region during the period under analysis. When evaluating the
other variables, the effect of the initial product continues to be
important, while the break-even point continues to have the opposite
sign to that which was expected.
If we look at the individual reforms, it is clear that the five
reforms considered are important in determining the growth of the
sample countries. The coefficient associated with privatisation is
also worthy of note. Its value is a good deal higher than the others,
as in the case of the equation for the per capita product. Once again,
in all five specifications the rate of saving and the educational level
do not seem important. The estimated initial income level




Latin America: Determination of per capita product growth, 1970-1995a
Basic Reform Trade Financial Capital account Privatisation Tax
model index openness reform liberalization reform
Ln(y0) -0.731 -0.706 -0.696 -0.721 -0.693 -0.689 -0.767
(0.127) (0.115) (0.122) (0.121) (0.116) (0.118) (0.119)
Ln(sK) 0.219 0.210 0.222 0.215 0.170 0.183 0.251
(0.163) (0.147) (0.156) (0.155) (0.149) (0.151) (0.152)
Ln(n+g+d) 0.590 0.659 0.585 0.638 0.777 0.493 0.632
(0.269) (0.243) (0.257) (0.257) (0.250) (0.250) (0.251)
Educational level (u) 0.036 -0.025 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 0.035 -0.013
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.031)
Reform (I) 0.449 0.231 0.156 0.372 0.709 0.355
(0.114) (0.089) (0.057) (0.100) (0.207) (0.110)
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.500 0.438 0.443 0.490 0.474 0.465
Mean standard error 0.111 0.100 0.106 0.106 0.101 0.103 0.104
White’s Test - n.R2 35.458 37.767 38.661 37.898 40.286 39.296 37.590
χ2 (5%) 43.773 49.800 49.800 49.800 49.800 49.800 49.800
F - fixed effectb 3.908 5.455 4.645 4.421 5.570 5.241 4.823
Hausman test 45.74 65.39 55.2 56.78 70.54 62.94 61.48
a  Numbers in brackets are standard errors of the estimates.
b  The F statistic calculated for the fixed effect test equals 2.37. The basic model has 64 degrees of freedom, while the rest have 63.
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